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Abstract
We extend the model of Cornand and Heinemann (2008, Economic
Journal) and examine how to implement partial announcement by
selling public information when the agents' action is strategic com-
plements. In a game of information acquisition, there exist multiple
equilibria and the partial announcement equilibrium is unstable if the
authorities sell public information at a constant price. However, if
the authorities oer an increasing pricing rule, partial announcement
equilibrium is stable and implementable.
JEL classication: C73, D82, D83, and E5
Keywords: Beauty contest games; Transparency of information; Par-
tial announcement policy
We are grateful to Keiichi Morimoto, Takashi Shimizu, the participants of Con-
tract Theory Workshop, Economics Seminar at Tokyo Metropolitan University, and the
Japanese Economic Association meeting at Toyama University.
yE-mail address: arato@shinshu-u.ac.jp
zE-mail address: t-hori@aoyamagakuin.jp
xE-mail address: nakamura@iser.osaka-u.ac.jp
1
1 Introduction
In the literature on public announcement, it is well-known that pub-
lic information announcement may have a detrimental welfare eect
through excess coordination of agents' actions (Morris and Shin, 2002).
Extending the beauty contest model of Morris and Shin (2002), Cor-
nand and Heinemann (2008) show that a partial-announcement policy,
which means that the authorities disseminate public information to a
certain fraction of agents, can alleviate the excess coordination. Cor-
nand and Heinemann (2008) assume that the fraction of agents who
receive public signal is exogenously given, and analyze the welfare
eect of partial announcement by comparative statics.
For policy makers, it is an important issue how to conduct the
partial-announcement policy. Cornand and Heinemann (2008) pro-
pose eight ways to exclude some fraction of the agents from acquiring
information. One of the ways is to \sell data at prices that not all
agents are willing to pay". In this paper, we examine how to conduct
the partial-announcement policy by assuming that the authorities sell
information to the agents at a certain price. As a result, in contrast
to the model of Cornand and Heinemann (2008), public information
acquisition is endogenously determined in our model.
We nd that it is not easy for the authorities to implement par-
tial announcement by selling data at a certain price. As shown by
Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009), when agent's action is strategic com-
plements, information acquisition is also strategic complements. Like-
wise, we prove that, if the authorities sell public information at a
certain price, this type of strategic complementarity causes multiple
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equilibria, which consist of two pure strategy equilibria (full- and no-
announcement equilibria), and a mixed strategy equilibrium (partial-
announcement equilibrium). The partial-announcement equilibrium
is unstable. Hence, unless the authorities could completely coordinate
beliefs of all agents, it is dicult to realize the partial-announcement
equilibrium by selling data at a certain price.
We propose a pricing rule of information in order to ensure the
uniqueness and stability of the partial-announcement equilibrium. If
the authorities oer a pricing rule such that a price of public infor-
mation is suciently increasing in the number of public information
users, they can coordinate the agents' expectation; hence the partial
announcement is implementable.
2 The Model
We borrow the model of Cornand and Heinemann (2008) except that
agents who require public information must pay a usage fee.
Payo structure There are the authorities and a continuum of
agents indexed by i 2 [0; 1]. Each agent i chooses an action ai 2 R to
maximize following payo,
ui(a; ) =  (1  r)(ai   )2| {z }
Loss 1
 r(Li   L)| {z }
Loss 2
 Ti + | {z }
Usage fee
; (1)
where a  fai : i 2 [0; 1]g is an action prole,  2 R is unobservable
state, and r 2 (0; 1) is a parameter that represents the degree of
strategic complementarity of action. Loss 1 is standard loss. Agent
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i suers a loss from a distance between ai and . Loss 2 is beauty
contest loss. Li 
R 1
0 (ai   aj)2dj means that agent i incurs a loss
from distances between ai and others' action aj . Loss 2 has zero-sum
structure because L  R 10 Ljdj.
Dene agents who use public information as users, others as non-
users, and P 2 [0; 1] as the share of users. In contrast to Cornand
and Heinemann (2008), P is an endogenous variable. The authorities
charge a constant usage fee for public information, T , and
Ti 
8>><>>:
T; if agent i uses public information;
0; otherwise.
 is lamp-sum transfer from the authorities to agents. Financial re-
source of  is total fee,  = PT . From (1), agent i's optimal action is
ai = (1  r)Ei() + rEi(a), where a =
R 1
0 aidi is an average action.
Information structure Information structure is following. As-
sume that all error terms are mutually independent. The state  is
uniformly distributed on R. After nature draws , agent i receives a
private signal xi =  + i with i  N(0; 1=). The authorities also
receive a public signal y =  +  with   N(0; 1=), and disclose it
only to users. In this setting, users' and non-users' estimations of  are
Eiu()  E(jxi; y) = xi+y+ and Ein()  E(jxi) = xi, respectively.
Timing of the game The game has two stages. At stage 1, agents
decide whether to buy the public information, y, given T that is set
by the authorities. At stage 2, the authorities disclose y only to the
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users, and all agents receive xi and choose ai.
3 Equilibrium
We solve the model by backward induction.
At stage 2, agents decide their actions given T and P . Because of
additive separability of our payo function, each agent's equilibrium
action strategy is the same as in Cornand and Heinemann (2008).
Result 1. The equilibrium action of non-users is ain = xi, and
the equilibrium action of users is aiu = xi + (1   )y, where  
(1 rP )
+(1 rP ) .
At stage 1, each agent decides whether to use y, given the other
agents' decision, hence P as given. Then, expected payo of user iu
is
wiu(P )  E[uiu(a)j] = E

  (1  r)(aiu   )2
  r
Z P
0
(aiu   aju)2dj +
Z 1
P
(aiu   ajn)2dj   rL
  T + 
=  (1  rP )(1  )
2

  r(1  P ) + (1 + rP )
2

+ rL  T + ; (2)
and, similarly, expected payo of non-user in is
win(P )   rP (1  )
2

  [1 + r(1  P )] + rP
2

+ rL+ : (3)
Agent i's problem can be written as maxpi piwiu(P ) + (1  pi)win(P ),
where pi 2 [0; 1] is agent i's mixed strategy whether to use y. From
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(P ), T
O Ppartial 1 P
T
(P )
Figure 1: Benet from acquiring public information
(2) and (3), agent i's net benet from receiving y is wi(P ):
wi(P )  wiu(P )  win(P ) = (+ )
 [+ (1  rP )]2   T  (P )  T;
where (P ) represents a gross benet of acquiring y. If the net benet
is positive, purchasing y is optimal for agent i. If negative, refrain from
buying y is optimal. If zero, the two alternatives are indierent.
Figure 1 represents the cost and benet of public information ac-
quisition. The net benet is strictly increasing in the fraction of in-
formation users because 0(P ) > 0 and T is constant. Hence, for
any T 2 ((0);(1)), there uniquely exists Ppartial 2 (0; 1) such that
(Ppartial) = T .1 Then, for all agents, their best response function,
1Partial announcement does not occur when T < (0) or T > (1).
6
R(P ), is
R(P )
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
= 0 if P < Ppartial;
2 [0; 1] if P = Ppartial;
= 1 if P > Ppartial:
(4)
As in Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009), R() represents that public in-
formation acquisition is strategic complements when action is strategic
complements.2 Public information is useful for inferring the other in-
formation users' action; hence, when action is strategic complements,
the private value of public information becomes higher as the number
of information users increases.
Multiple equilibria and (in)stability A mixed strategy pro-
le, (pi), is an equilibrium if, for all i, pi is a best response for the
others' strategy prole p i. From the law of large numbers, P = R(P )
holds in a symmetric equilibrium.
We can easily verify that the strategic complementarities about
information acquisition causes multiple equilibria. Figure 2 represents
the best response when (0) < T < (1). pi = 0 (pi = 1) for all i
is an equilibrium, because agent i's best response is pi = 0 (pi = 1)
for p i = 0 (p i = 1). Moreover, pi = Ppartial 2 (0; 1) for all i,
where Ppartial satises (Ppartial) = T , is also an equilibrium because
2Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009) point out that, in the beauty contest situation, infor-
mation acquisition is strategic complements so that multiple equilibria arise. A dierence
between them and ours is the proposed ways to make equiliblium unique. They propose
a way to realize a unique pure strategy equilibrium. In contrast, we focus on a stabil-
ity of a mixed strategy equilibrium. Hence, in section 4, we propose a way to make the
mixed strategy equilibrium unique, because the mixed strategy equilibrium corresponds
to partial-announcement one.
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pi = Ppartial is a best response for p i = Ppartial.
Proposition 1. Suppose that the authorities apply the constant pric-
ing rule. Then,
1. If T 2 ((0);(1)), then multiple equilibria arise as follows.
(a) No-announcement equilibrium: pi = 0 for all i, hence P = 0,
(b) Full-announcement equilibrium: pi = 1 for all i, hence P = 1,
(c) Partial-announcement equilibirum: pi = Ppartial for all i,
hence P = Ppartial.
2. If T < (0) or T > (1), there does not exist any partial-
announcement equilibrium.
Next, we dene a stability of an equilibrium, following Milgrom and
Roberts (1990) and Vives (1990). In what follows, we describe equi-
librium by its outcome Pl; l = 1; 2; 3; where P1 = 0; P2 = Ppartial; P3 =
1, corresponds to no-announcement, partial announcement, and full-
announcement, respectively. A Cournot tatonnement in our game is
dened as the process fP (t)g: P (0) 2 [0; 1], P (t) 2 R(P (t   1)),
t = 1; 2;    . We dene the stability of equilibrium as follows.
Denition. An equilibrium Pl 2 [0; 1] is stable if there exists P (0) 6=
Pl such that the Cournot tatonnement starting at P (0) converges to
Pl.
Figure 2 represents the best-response dynamics and equilibrium
stability in our information acquisition game. When P (0) 2 [0; Ppartial),
the best-response dynamics converges to P1(= 0). When P (0) 2
(Ppartial; 1], it converges to P3(= 1). Hence, the following proposition
holds.
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1R(P )
O Ppartial 1 P
Ppartial
Figure 2: Best response dynamics and (in)stability of equilibrium
Proposition 2. Suppose that the authorities apply the constant pric-
ing rule with T 2 ((0);(1)). Then, no-announcement and full-
announcement equilibrium are stable, and partial-annoucement equi-
librium is unstable.
Such an equilibrium instability implies that coordination of the
agents' expectation is essential in order to achieve the optimal degree
of public information dissemination.3
4 A Coordination Device of Expecta-
tion
We propose a solution that the authorities guide the agents to the
unique partial-announcement equilibrium. The cause of the coordina-
3In our model, the welfare-maximizing ratio of information users is P  = minf1; +3r g,
when T  = 94(+) (or 0) if = < 3r 1 (or =  3r 1). P  is the same as in Cornand
and Heinemann (2008). Proposition 2 implies any equilibrium in which Ppartial(T ) 2 (0; 1)
is unstable, including the case that Ppartial = P .
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tion failure is that, owing to the strategic complementarities, wi(P )
is upward sloping. To align the agents' belief, we employ another
pricing rule that has strategic substitution eect. Assume that the
fee suciently increases in the number of users. Formally, consider a
pricing rule T = 	(P ), where 	(P ) satises 	(Ppartial) = T , and
	(P )
8>><>>:
< (P ) if P > Ppartial;
> (P ) if P < Ppartial:
The strategic substitution eect of (P ) counteracts the strategic
complementarities of information acquisition, and makes wi(P ) down-
ward sloping. Then, the agents plausibly believe that P = Ppartial is
realized, because the agents' best response function is
R(P )
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
= 1 if P < Ppartial;
2 [0; 1] if P = Ppartial;
= 0 if P > Ppartial;
and, hence, an equilibrium P = Ppartial uniquely exists (Figure 3).
This shows that, by using the increasing pricing rule as a coordination
device, the authorities can implement a partial-announcement policy.
5 Conclusion
Partial-announcement policy is a solution for alleviating over coor-
dination problem generated by strategic complementarities in action.
However, such strategic complementarities makes information acqui-
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(P ), T
O Ppartial 1 P
(P )
R(P )
O Ppartial 1 P
1
T = 	(P )
Figure 3: Increasing pricing rule and stability of equilibrium
sition also strategic complements, hence strategic complementarities
themselves may disturb the implementation of partial announcement.
Nevertheless, the partial announcement policy becomes implementable
under some increasing pricing rules.
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